
Truth, Time and History
A Philosophical Inquiry
Truth, Time and History investigates the reality of the past by connecting arguments across areas which are conventionally discussed in isolation from each other.
Breaking the impasse within the narrower analytic debate between Dummett’s semantic anti-realists and the truth value link realists as to whether the past exists independently of our methods of verification, the book argues, through an examination of the puzzles concerning identity over time, that only the present exists. Drawing on Lewis’s analogy between times and possible worlds, and work by Collingwood and Oakeshott, and the continental philosopher, Barthes, the author advances a wholly novel proposal, as to how aspects of ersatz presentism may be combined with historical coherentism to uphold the legitimacy of discourse about the past.
In highlighting the role of historians in the creation and construction of temporality, Truth, Time and History offers a convincing philosophical argument for the inherence of an unreal past in the real present.
The video introduction to Truth, Time and History was featured by The Day in their article on time – Time flies – except when it starts to crawl.
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Table of Contents
Part I: Truth
1. The realist/anti-realist wars
2. Projection, analogy and meaning
Part II: Time
3. Tense theory
4. Leibniz’s Law and the paradox of diachronic identity
5. Presentism and modality
Part III: History
6. Collingwood and Oakeshott: is history possible?
7. A realist present and a coherentist past
Bibliography
Index
Reviews of Truth, Time and History
“Botros' book has the virtue of being both incredibly insightful philosophically on all the topics it covers – truth, time and history – and very accessible. Her case for presentism and a rejection of the past as an independent entity is a daring yet persuasive one, and philosophers (of history) and historians would do well to acquaint themselves with it.”
Sina Talachian, Cambridge University, in Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Volume 94, Issue 3, July 2019, pp 489-491
A video introduction to Truth, Time and History
Time

A more indirect, but in my view, more sure, route to the conclusion that the past is unreal takes off from the notion of identity over time. I argue that it is impossible to believe both that the past exists, and also, as we all ordinarily do, that things persist through change. Consider a green leaf turning brown in autumn. You will agree: it has to be the same leaf that was once green that is now brown. For if it were a different leaf – a brown one – it could not be said to have lost its greenness since it never was green. But the great 18th Century philosopher, Leibniz stipulates – surely incontrovertibly – that a thing cannot be the same as itself and yet have divergent properties from itself. So it seems it has to be the same leaf in order to lose its greenness, but being the same leaf means precisely retaining its greenness: a contradiction. So what you may say: philosophers’ worry is not ours: obviously things persist within limits, depending on their kind. But, are you saying, we will reply, that it requires less than identity to persist? These are deep and difficult questions. It seems clear however that identity is an atemporal relation that cannot accommodate the unidirectionality of time’s arrow. It is eventually concluded that the contradiction cannot be resolved so long as the leaf’s having been green has an equal reality with the leaf’s being brown, and that this provides grounds for demoting the past, and maintaining that only present things exist.